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In the absence of proper management, fishery resource tends to be exploited as a common property 
resource with a tendency towards over-exploitation. In the absence of appropriate property rights, 
the exploitation of a common property such as the fisheries may lead to over exploitation (and 
possible extinction of a species but not with migratory species such as the southern blue fin tuna) 
and externalities both contemporaneous and inter-generational.  The paper aims to identify the 
various economic policy instruments that may be available and then uses a ‘cubic’ model to select 
the best model suitable for the blue fin tuna fishery. Price control is selected as the appropriate 
policy instrument, even though individual transferable catch quota is also a possibility. Price control 
is based on levying a tax on catches and is oriented towards economic efficiency. 
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AN EVALUATION OF FISHERIES POLICIES AVAILABLE TO AUSTRALIA FOR THE 
MANAGEMENT OF SOUTHERN BLUE FIN TUNA FISHERY 
 
1. Introduction 
It is claimed that the purpose of fisheries management should be to control the fishery in a manner, 
which will continue to yield net benefits for the community, and is in accord with national goals. If 
society exercises no control over capital and labour, fishery resources will attract excess investments 
and economic rents will be dissipated (Anderson and Wilson, 1977). 
 
Furthermore, every period of good harvest or high prices tends to result in an increased inflow of 
new boats and gear (Department of Primary Industry, 1986). These fishermen are not easily driven 
out again when the market is weak, because fishermen are notably immobile (Christy, 1976, 
Crutchfield, 1986).  
 
In the absence of property rights the operation of the free market does not lead to a socially rational 
allocation of resources, even though it may appear to the individual crew to be rational. This is 
because individual fishermen may impose costs on one another, such as congestion cost (a 
contemporaneous externality), that are not transmitted through normal market forces. Thus from a 
fisheries management point of view, it is important to internalise these externalities. 
 
Maintaining a constant stock of renewable fishery resource is a necessary condition for sustainable 
exploitation of a fishery. Maintaining a constant stock of fishery resource is necessary to meet both 
the present and future needs of the population. In other words, it is aimed at maintaining inter-
generational equity.  
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It is a well-known fact that in a common property situation, reducing the use of the resource by one 
individual will contribute to the available supply of the other users. Therefore, the user has no 
incentive to conserve the resource in a sustainable manner. This action could ultimately lead to the 
depletion of the renewable resource beyond recovery (not in the case of migratory tuna). Therefore, 
to overcome this problem some form of quasi property rights have to be given to these resources as 
giving pure private property rights is not possible with migratory species such as the southern blue 
fin tuna. This is only possible by some sort of administrative mechanism. 
 
The other necessary conditions for sustainable fisheries management is: 
 
• To prevent crowding externality and  
• To prevent the dissipation of rent.  
 
Crowding externality 
This arises because of over commitment of resources to the common property. That is too many 
boats and too many fishermen resulting in too much effort. The operation of the free market system 
in the fishing industry does not lead to a rational allocation of resources as far as the society is 
concerned, even though it may appear to the individual to be rational. This is because individual 
fishermen may impose costs on one another, such as congestion cost, that are not transmitted 
through normal market forces. To explain this let us take the case of a boatman travelling between 
two points A and B and using one channel. The demand for travel between these two points is shown 
in Figure 1 by a downward sloping demand curve DD. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
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The average cost per boat journey is given by the curve EFJKH and the marginal cost curve by 
EFILG. Up to point F, the average cost is equal to the marginal cost because there is no congestion 
externality. However, as the congestion increases, the average cost begins to rise because of lost 
time, additional cost of fuel and even possibility of greater susceptibility to accidents. When average 
cost rises the marginal cost will be above the average cost. This happens at point F. But when 
average cost is constant the marginal cost will be equal to the average cost, this is between points E 
and F. 
In a common property situation individuals base their decision on average cost and not on the 
collective marginal cost due to additional traffic. Given the demand curve and cost curves shown, 
boatman will make V2 boat journeys per unit of time. But in terms of economic efficiency V1 boat 
journeys are optimal. This is because at V1 the demand, which measures the marginal private benefit, 
is equal to the marginal private cost. 
 
V2 journey instead of V1 journey results in a dead weight social loss given by area IKL which is the 
difference between the collective marginal cost between V1 and V2 journeys (given by area V1ILV2) 
and the value of the additional journey to the boatman (given by area V1IKV2). Therefore at V2 
number of boat journey per unit of time between the two fixed points, there is a loss in economic 
efficiency, because the additional marginal cost exceeds the additional marginal benefit. Only at 
point I, the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit. Thus V1 is the Pareto efficient point with 
regard to the number of boat journeys per unit of time. The efficiency aspect implies that this should 
be the level of effort that any management tool should try to achieve in the open access fisheries. 
 
Dissipation of rent 
In a common property situation the fishermen do not care for marginal productivity but cares only 
for the average productivity. This is because the average productivity is the one that indicates where 
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the greater total catch may be obtained by any tuna boat. That is for individuals who are unable to 
appropriate property rights to any part of the fishery; the average revenue product of effort is the 
relevant measure to compare his income in alternative employment (Tisdell, 1983). Therefore the 
fishermen will continue to exploit the fishery up to the point where their average cost of exploitation 
of a tuna boat is equal to their average revenue productivity of that boat. When average product is 
equated to average cost, rent is dissipated. As natural resources belong to the society it is important 
to prevent any rent dissipation.  
 
Therefore in a common property situation, all profits will be competed away at the point where the 
average revenue product of effort is equal to the average cost. In Figure 2 it is at effort level equal to 
E0. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
If on the other hand, private property rights prevailed in this fishery, then the marginal revenue 
product of individual boat’s effort is the relevant measure with which to compare someone’s income 
from alternative employment. In such a situation the marginal cost will be equated to the marginal 
revenue product and the rent from the resource will be maximised (Sathiendrakumar, 1996).  Thus, 
with private property rights the optimum allocation effort will be E1, where the marginal cost of 
effort is equal to the marginal revenue product of effort (see Figure 2) and the maximum rent will be 
denoted by the area WRFS.  
 
Thus, common property implies a dissipation of rent equal to area SAM, which is precisely equal to 
area WRFS. Also note that the average revenue product with private property rights (point F) is 
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greater than the average revenue product with common property rights (point A), ceteris paribus. 
That is, with private property, production will result in higher effort productivity. 
 
Therefore the aim of any management strategy should be to give some form of private property 
rights to the fishery. The allocation of property rights should not be aimed at giving those rights to 
the powerful and rich lobby groups only. Economically rational exploitation of fisheries would 
effectively raise fishermen’s incomes.  
 
2. Selection criteria for tuna fishery management strategies  
 
Any economic instrument used in managing the southern blue fin tuna fishery should satisfy the 
following three important criteria, namely: 
 
• The economic efficiency principle or the cost minimisation principle. That is, it should provide a 
least cost solution, including the administrative and compliance cost. 
• The equity principle. That is, its effect on the distribution of wealth and on other supplementary 
goals such as employment must be considered. 
• The acceptability principle. That is it should be acceptable to both the politicians and the 
fishermen as a tool that will effectively control fishing effort. Acceptability also includes 
flexibility so that it will allow for proper reaction to changes in both economic and biological 
conditions. That is, it is dynamic in nature. 
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3. The cubic model 
We could represent the above three principles, namely: efficiency, equity and acceptability 
principles as a ‘cubic’ model. The framework in Figure 3 is in the form of a cube whose surfaces 
represent cost effectiveness, equity and acceptability principles. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
The eight corners of the cube are labelled as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’. The positions 
‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, and ‘D’ are the ones that satisfy the efficiency principle (or cost effectiveness 
principle). Likewise, the corners ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘A’ and ‘B’ are the ones that satisfy the acceptability 
principle. The corners ‘A’, ‘D’, ‘E’ and ‘H’ are the ones that satisfy the equity principle. Therefore, 
the policy instrument that satisfies all three principles is in position ‘A’. The position that satisfies at 
least two of these three principles is corners ‘E’, ‘D’, and ‘B’. In reality it is not possible to achieve 
these corner solutions. Therefore we draw concentric circles using the effectiveness of all our three 
objectives mentioned before for each of the policy instrument around these corners and select the 
policy instrument whose concentric circle is closer to the desired corner ‘A’. Thus we could use the 
above framework to select the appropriate policy instrument that could be used to satisfy the 
principles that we aim to achieve namely; efficiency, equity, and acceptability. The economic 
instruments that are considered are discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Choice of economic instruments in managing migratory blue fin tuna 
There are many fisheries management measures that can be considered by a government 
(Department of Primary Industry, 1986). For the purpose of our discussion, three principal 
management mechanisms listed bellow will be examined in this section as they could easily be 
applied to the southern blue fin tuna fishery in Australia. These measures are namely: 
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• Limited entry 
• Catch quotas (open or individual) 
• Financial controls 
 
Limited entry 
A limited entry system enables the achievement of economic efficiency in the fisheries sector 
(Christy, 1976) in the long run, by controlling all dimensions of effort so as to achieve the optimal 
level of effort. This will prevent dissipation of rent. 
 
Limited entry involves the setting of a maximum limit on the number of boats allowed to participate. 
Limited entry system prevents the dissipation of economic rents in fisheries. Limited entry in its 
simplest form does not impose any restrictions on boat size; gear type etc. except for setting limits 
on the number of tuna boats. Therefore, some form of licensing of tuna boats is required to restrict 
this number 
 
Economic theory predicts that in the absence of zero elasticity of substitution between the restricted 
and the unrestricted dimensions of effort, the unrestricted dimensions of effort will be substituted for 
the restricted ones. This substitution will be possible only for the rich fishermen because of the high 
cost of the unrestricted dimensions of effort. Therefore, this policy will be regressive in terms of 
equity. 
 
Pearce and Willen (1979); and Kailis (1982) document examples of restrictive licensing of just a few 
effort components resulting in the expansion of other components such that the least cost 
combination is not achieved. Therefore this fails in the cost minimisation aspects as well. . 
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Furthermore, restricting all dimensions of effort through licensing will hinder technical progress in 




Catch quotas may be either open quotas or individual transferable quotas. Either type of quota can be 
affective in achieving the biological goal of stock protection. However, with a migratory species 
such as blue fin tuna that breeds in Western Australia and migrates through South Australia, New 
South Wales and goes up to Japanese cost, protection of stock levels is only possible with a 
concerted united joint action by all countries that fish for southern blue fin tuna in this region.  
 
With open quotas individual fishermen tend to increase their effort in order to take a larger share of 
the total allowable catch. This in turn will result in over capitalisation of tuna boats and the resulting 
under-utilisation of fishing boats. Therefore, the use of open quotas in managing the blue fin tuna 
fishery will not be considered. 
 
With individual transferable quotas, individual quotas are allocated as a share of the total catch. 
Therefore, it is left to the individual fishermen to determine the most profitable way of harvesting 
the fish. This will satisfy the cost minimisation strategy. Therefore, such a policy will satisfy all 




Management by financial controls involves providing access to all subject to the payment of an 
appropriate tax. This financial control could be of two forms 
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• Tax on inputs 
• Tax on catch 
 
Tax on inputs 
This is based on the fact that a tax on effort will increase the cost of fishing, which in turn will 
reduce the total effort by removing those fishermen who are unwilling or unable to pay the tax. But 
“tax on effort is likely to induce changes in the method of production, leading to higher total costs 
for society” (Anderson and Wilson, 1977 p.711). This will result in regulation induced inefficiency. 
Furthermore, tax on inputs will be successful only if it is possible to prevent alternative non-taxed 
inputs being used by the fishermen to increase their effort or when tax is applied to all dimensions of 
effort.  
 
There are two problems with the latter approach. First problem is that such a measure will not 
encourage technological progress that may reduce the cost of fishing. Good management schemes 
should also allow for technical improvements, which can be reflected as a net gain to the society. 
The other problem is that effort is difficult to define and measure (Treschev, 1978), especially 
because it is subjected to continuous revision as technology changes. Since this management 
measure fails to satisfy the efficiency and the acceptability criteria, it is not recommended as a 
management measure for the blue fin tuna fishery. 
 
Tax based on catch  
The tax on catch is oriented towards economic efficiency. The economic effect of imposing a tax on 
catch is to increase the cost of fishing or reduce profitability. This increased cost or decreased 
revenue deters the marginal fishing fleet from fishing and therefore will result reducing the size of 
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effort to the most efficient level. . In Figure 2 it will shift the equilibrium effort level to E1 from E0. 
That is achieving the maximum economic yield level of effort.  
 
Tax on catch satisfies all three faces in our ‘cubic’ model, namely efficiency, equity and 
acceptability. Of all the alternatives, other than individual transferable catch quota that were 
discussed, tax on catch is the only policy instrument that satisfies all the three policy objectives. It 
also allows for technological progress in the long-run. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To give the blue fin tuna fishermen  some incentive to conserve the fishery resource in a manner, 
which will not dissipate rent and also will not lead to crowding externalities, some form of quasi 
property rights have to be given. This is only possible by some sort of political/administrative 
mechanism. Such a mechanism will prevent the over-exploitation and diminishing returns to the 
society that is associated with the open-access to the fishery. In other words, a good fisheries 
management tool should prevent the destructive pattern of competition among fishermen for a share 
of the limited fishery resource. 
 
At present biological overfishing leading to extinction of blue fin tuna may not a problem . 
Therefore the management policy should be to control economic over-fishing.  In the context of blue 
fin tuna fishery only two management policies are feasible, namely tax on catch and transferable 
catch quotas that satisfies all the three policy objectives that were specified in the model. 
Furthermore, a tax on fish catch as well as individual transferable quotas also has the added 
advantage of not limiting technical progress in the future, unlike a tax on effort. Also this revenue 
from tax on catch, as well as generating money by auctioning the individual transferable quotas will 
provide the opportunity to generate funds that may be used to defray the cost of management. The 
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revenue generated from this southern blue fin tuna fishery by the government should be only utilised 
to improve the living condition of any fishermen that may be displaced from the fishery or to 
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Figure 1:  Total number of boat journeys per unit of time between
     two fixed points when congestion begins at point F 













Figure 2: The effort levels with common property 
   and private property rights 
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